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Of Minds, Morals, and Methods:  
Combining Moral Meteorology and Disaster Relief  
in Historiography of China’s Disaster Management 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In this working paper, I argue that disaster management in high Qing period can be better 
understood by simultaneously considering the historiographies of governing elites’ metaphysical 
construction of disaster causation and their administration of disaster relief. For metaphysical 
construction of disaster causation, I highlight the concept of moral meteorology coined by 
environmental historian Mark Elvin that describes the prevalent ideology in imperial China that 
implicated human conduct, in particular that of governing elites, with manifestations of disasters. 
For disaster relief administration, I highlight the public granary system, and in particular, the role 
of ever-normal granary (changping cang, 常平仓) in disaster relief administration, also noting how 
its purpose extended beyond solely grain provision in the wake of disasters. The multipurpose 
granary system collapsed by the mid-nineteenth century under the weight of intensive demands 
from rapid changes in China’s population, economy, and environment since High Qing period. 
Interestingly, the moral meteorological arguments exhorted by the governing elites were also 
waning, giving way to proto-scientific explanations for disaster occurrences. By juxtaposing 
ideological and administrative shifts during late imperial China as evidenced in their individual 
historiographies, I argue that these two streams of historiographical work are inextricably related 
and likely animated by two conditions. First is the general decline of the Qing regime. Second, 
decoupling moral conduct from frequent and disastrous extreme events was Qing governing elites’ 
attempt to preserve their legitimacy. Finally, I propose that the approach of combining intellectual 
and administrative historiographies offers a useful general framework to examine the 
historiography of disaster management beyond that of High Qing period or even imperial China.  
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In this working paper, I argue that disaster management in High Qing period can be better 
understood by simultaneously considering the historiographies of how governing elites understood 
disasters at the metaphysical level and the administration of disaster relief. During High Qing, the 
regime encountered rapid changes in population, economy, and environment. By governing elites, 
I refer to Qing emperors and their bureaucracy. While I do not present original empirical findings 
in this paper, the historiographical discussions represent my initial effort to contribute to a more 
sociologically grounded and historical accounts of disaster management in non-American and non-
European contexts. In other words, I hope my paper offers a more situated reading of development 
in Chinese emergency management mechanistically through the particular lens of Western 
experience (Kuhn 2002; Thornton 2007).1 Just as important, this paper counts as my attempt to 
continue an enduring tradition in sociology that attends to the sociological conditions in which 
disasters came to shape societies and also be shaped by societal shifts (such as Erikson 1978; 
Freudenburg et al. 2009).  
Rather than focusing exclusively on either historical work that elaborates the ideological 
underpinnings of how Qing governing elites conceived, understood, and organized risks, or the 
administrative history of how specific disasters were managed, my efforts will be on arguing how 
both streams of historiographical research when combined has the potential to generate additional 
insights and stimulate more inquiries into the development of China’s disaster management. This 
in turn contributes to the body of knowledge on how a “modern” Chinese emergency management 
comes to be what it is today. 
                                               
1 Kuhn’s (2002) analyses of the influence of Qing political thinker Wei Yuan (魏源) on the literati of his time 
exemplify my aspiration for more nuanced thinking. Kuhn points out how Wei's political philosophy is often 
misinterpreted as being progressive and modern by Westerners. Specifically, according to Kuhn, a careful reading of 
Wei's writings in tandem with an understanding of the historical context would reveal that Wei was never in doubt 
that political reform should serve to enhance the authoritarian rule of the imperial state. 
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My paper proceeds as follows. First, to preface the discussion on these two aspects of 
disaster management, I sketch the economic, environmental, and socio-cultural landscape of late 
imperial China, emphasizing the reign of Kangxi, Yongzheng, and Qianlong.2 This summary 
provides the context to understand the nature and dynamics of famine administration in that era.  
Second, with respect to the ideological historiography of Chinese disaster management 
during high Qing period, I highlight Mark Elvin’s (1998b) concept of moral meteorology as the 
prevalent understanding that Qing governing elites relied upon to relate human conduct to the 
manifestation of disasters. Moral meteorology can be understood as a “folk theory” of how the 
moral quality of human conduct can induce geological and weather repercussions. It therefore 
provides an interpretive lens through which the administration of disaster management that 
emerged during that period could be understood and rendered meaningful. At suitable junctures, I 
draw upon other historiographical studies, such as the development of neo-Confucianism (Hung 
2009), the history of the literati (Kuhn 2002), and of the state (Thornton 2007) to support my 
arguments. 
Third, I introduce the administrative historiography of disaster management in imperial 
China by highlighting the state granary system in famine administration and its accompanying 
bureaucracy, policies, and performance. The famine relief conducted by China’s governing elites 
in response to natural “triggers” (e.g., earthquakes, floods, and droughts), including the role of 
ever-normal granaries (changping cang, 常平仓), would be categorized in modern-day terms as 
disaster response and recovery. To be elaborated later, I discuss how the purposes of the ever-
                                               
2 Strictly speaking, Kangxi, Yongzheng, and Qianlong, were not the names of the emperors, but their reign periods. 
For example, the emperor of Kangxi reign period was Xuan Ye (玄烨). The reign periods for the three emperors 
were 1661-1722, 1722-1735, and 1735-1796 respectively.  
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normal granary extended beyond grain provision in the wake of disasters. Essentially, the granary 
system was also a state-designed mechanism to regulate prices in regional grain markets.  
Finally, I conclude by making clear the connections between the moral meteorology of 
Qing governing elites and the granary system to underscore how they were inextricably related. 
Briefly, I argue that the famine relief efforts by the governing elites were partially but significantly 
motivated and sustained by moral meteorology. Unfortunately, sheer ideological power was not 
sufficient as a means to prop up such a complex and gargantuan system. Under the weight of 
intensive demand for resources and attention, the multipurpose granary system finally collapsed 
by mid-nineteenth century. Just as important, the collapse was coterminous with the waning hold 
of the prevailing moral meteorology among governing elites.  
Contextualizing the Qing Regime 
The first half of the Qing dynasty marked the greatest geographical expansion of empire 
since the Mongol domination (Yuan dynasty) during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, 
covering a landmass that was even more larger than modern-day China (Cohen 2000). The 
population also underwent tremendous growth, particularly during Qianlong’s reign (1735-1796) 
when it expanded from 143 million in 1740 to 300 million in 1784, an impressive 110% increase 
less than half a century (Kuhn 2002). 
Interestingly, a classic Malthusian crisis—in which the rate of population growth was 
anticipated to outstrip the rate of increase of food supply—did not manifest as a consequence of 
this tremendous societal change. In fact, not only food output did not fall behind population growth, 
the economy was also booming, particularly in the Yangzi Delta region (Pomeranz 2000). 
However, the dual pressures of demographic and economic expansion precipitated a series of 
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ecological crises, resulting in deforestation, hillside erosions, and floods (Elvin 1998a; Janku 2009; 
Kuhn 2002). For example, flood occurrence was frequent: there were 12 recorded instances in the 
final 20 years of the eighteenth century, with consecutive annual occurrences from 1796 to 1799 
(Kuhn 2002). 
Yet, the economic and population growth did not bring about a corresponding increase in 
the size of the state bureaucracy to manage the multiple facets of expansion. In other words, the 
governing elites had not prepared for the requisite complexity and resources, and therefore, 
unlikely built administrative capabilities to manage a bigger and more diverse population. As an 
indicator of its stagnation, the number of counties remained largely the same since the eleventh 
century when the population was only about 50 million, six times smaller than High Qing’s (Kuhn 
2002). Another indicator is the fiscal size of the imperial government. Estimates of state revenue 
from taxation in the eighteenth century likely never exceeded one per cent of total gross national 
product (Shiue 2005). Furthermore, given the mixed success of taxation reforms, particularly under 
the reign of Yongzheng, state coffers were not growing after a certain point, thereby imposing a 
material limit to any bureaucratic expansion to meet the needs of government (Thornton 2007). 
That said, the Qing state still managed to institute hydraulic infrastructure and public granaries to 
mitigate, prepare for, and respond to disasters such as droughts and floods, given its modest 
resources and its limited success in fiscal reforms during the mid-eighteenth century (Dodgen 1991; 
Hung 2009; Will and Wong 1991). 
Apart from the administrative limitations on man and material discussed above, the 
stagnation in the state bureaucracy likely also suffered from self-imposed ideological constraints 
that could be partially traced to the enduring (and tautological) belief that frugal government was 
judged as “a cherished marker of a heaven-favored dynastic regime” among the cultural elites who 
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populated the imperial bureaucracy at all levels and local gentry (Kuhn 2002:23). It made sense 
for the Manchus, in establishing themselves as a conquest dynasty, to procure acceptance from 
Chinese cultural elites by deploying assiduously “indigenous” Confucian rationality. The cultural 
elites harbored notions of exclusivity including boundaries of officialdom, thereby restricting 
officeholders to those who were schooled just like them in the classics.3 They further defined 
narrowly what constituted public interest. A normative or moral agenda permeated public life 
(Thornton 2007), crouched in the “righteous rhetoric of personal ethics” (Kuhn 2002:13) that 
rested on neo-Confucian morality. In particular, it was the strand that emphasized the collective 
over the individual and endorsed a rigid application of universal filial piety beyond the familial 
hierarchy to the relationships between a ruler, his officials, and his subjects, “grounded on absolute 
obedience from below and paternalist care from above” (Hung 2009:82).  
Overlapping with Confucian sensitivities about morality, I highlight moral meteorology in 
the next section, the cosmic connections between moral conduct and natural disasters as the 
common stock of knowledge about cosmological beliefs and moral ideals in which the cultural 
and governing elites draw upon to conceive and organize disaster management.  
Moral Meteorology as Ideology 
Coined by environmental historian Mark Elvin, moral meteorology refers to using moral 
misconduct as explanations for causes of disasters. To elaborate, it underscores how the 
manifestation of disasters is a consequence of the moral deficiencies of people residing in a 
geographical area (Elvin 1998b). The specific beliefs and the ways in which they manifest are 
                                               
3 The sphere of exclusivity was astounding. According to Benjamin Elman, the proportion of the “classically 
trained” literati was never more than one per cent of the entire population. Also, less than one per cent of the cultural 
elites held administrative office during Qing regime. See p. 237 in Elman, Benjamin. 2000. A Cultural History of 
Civil Examination in Late Imperial China. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
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highly situated. For example, in medieval Europe, the predominance of Christianity and the church 
as formidable institutions did not directly implicate the political elites and monarchy as the source 
to induce disasters, a portent of moral decay. Instead the cause was deemed to be based on the 
degenerative moral behavior of the more general populace. Additionally, the moral meteorology 
was also expressed through the church in the forms of disaster-related rituals and liturgies (Svensen 
2009).4 
However, when applied to imperial China, natural disasters as a portent while also similarly 
served as an indication of moral deficiencies, the causal root was founded on the moral conduct of 
the regime. The hierarchy of causal influence further followed this order of decreasing strength: 
first, it was the emperor, then his bureaucracy, and least of all, the common folk (Elvin 1998b). 
Not difficult to see, the notion that the conduct of governing elites (i.e., the emperor and his 
officials) were deemed to be the most consequential also deeply implicated the prevailing neo-
Confucian orthodoxy of that era.  
The act of placing themselves as the central shapers of meteorological phenomena served 
multiple purposes that might be contradictory in some occasions. As pointed out by Andrea Janku 
(2009), the conceptual maneuver was self-serving because by maintaining the mythical connection 
between morality and meteorology, the state necessitated the management of natural disasters 
under its continual purview. Understood this way, the concept of “nourishing the people” (yangmin, 
养民) present in historiography of disaster relief administration is no longer an autonomous idea 
                                               
4 Alas, moral meteorology continues its hold on some quarters of the population in different societies even today. 
The specter of moral misconduct haunts recent disasters, natural (e.g., 2005 Hurricane Katrina, 2010 Haiti 
earthquake) and man-made (e.g., the MH370 and MH17 tragedies). For example, a Malaysian official attributed 
their tragedies to un-Islamic behavior, such as serving alcohol and exposing flesh. See http://www.ibtimes.co.in 
/mh370-mh17-tragedies-were-caused-due-un-islamic-behaviours-like-serving-alcohol-exposing-612933. Accessed 
on November 11, 2014. 
Wee-Kiat LIM 
Page 9 of 20 
A version of this manuscript was shared at D. Kim Foundation Workshop, January 5, 2015 
but one that could be linked to more robust ideological and metaphysical foundation centered on 
moral meteorology and neo-Confucian rationality. To elaborate, yangmin was an expression of the 
paternalist care that governing elites were expected to impose on their subjects (Edgerton-Tarpley 
2012; Will and Wong 1991). 
To be clear, the “moral reading of disasters” (Janku 2009:233) while presented in the 
Confucian vocabulary of piety and paternalistic care during Qing rule—in which heaven-sent 
disasters (tianzai, 天灾) was causally tied to the legitimacy of the leaders, or the “mandate of 
heaven” (tianming, 天命 )—preceded Confucianism and was deeply entrenched in Chinese 
mythology and history of high antiquity.5 This could be demonstrated in three expressions. Elvin 
(199b) highlighted the first and most familiar expression, one which was a portent of moral decay, 
after the fact. Janku (2009) described the other two scenarios as trials and warnings. In one 
expression, natural disasters could be also interpreted as a heaven-sent trial of a ruler’s ability to 
deal with crises, represented by the Great Yu (大禹) as the cultural hero in flood management. In 
the final expression, it could also serve as a warning for the ruler to further examine his moral 
integrity, thus providing an opportunity for him to accept personal responsibility for the people’s 
welfare.   
                                               
5 Here, I quote Janku (2009) and Edgerton-Tarpley (2012) at length: 
 
The nine-year deluge at the time of the cultural heroes Yao and Shun, which the Great Yu, the first 
ruler of the Xia dynasty (considered to have lasted from ca. 2100 BC to ca. 1600 BC) finally 
brought under control; the tremendous earthquakes during the last years of that dynasty; the seven-
year drought under Tang, first ruler of the Shang dynasty (ca. 1600 BC - ca. 1100 BC); successive 
floods during that dynasty, leading to five relocations of the capital city; and the devastating 
earthquake at the close of the Shang, which brought to an end the rule of the evil Zhou, the last 
Shang king (Janku 2009:233). 
 
Once (the Great) Yu “opened the passages for the streams” and “deepened the channels and 
canals,” the people were able to obtain enough grain to eat, and the different states “began to come 
under good rule” (Edgerton-Tarpley 2012:4). 
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The combined 153 years under the reign of Kangxi, Yongzheng, and Qianlong marked the 
zenith of the rhetoric around moral causality in late imperial China, in which varying degrees of 
attribution were directed at different members of society (specifically the emperor, officials, and 
subjects) and multiple levels of government (e.g., provincial) (Elvin 1998b). For example, Kangxi 
emperor argued that the governing elites state-wide were directly responsible for an earthquake in 
1679:6 
There has now occurred a large and sudden earthquake. The general explanation 
for this is that We (朕) are lacking in virtue...and that many of those whom We have 
employed to administer the government are not sincere or helpful. Central and 
provincial officials, you are unable to purify your heart-minds,...you deceive your 
superiors, act in your personal interests...or behave wantonly and oppress the people, 
turning right and wrong upside down, ...disrupting the harmony of Heaven above, 
and calling down this disaster (Elvin 1998b:219). 
 
After Kangxi, Yongzheng and Qianlong further refined moral meteorology as a means to 
identify specific locales and their officials for praise or punishment using regional meteorological 
reports. The following decrees by Yongzheng and Qianlong respectively evidenced episodes of 
censorious treatment: 
There were abundant harvests everywhere last year throughout the province of Zhili. 
Only three administrative subdivisions, Xuanhua, Huailai, and Baoan, missed being 
fertilized by the rains. We thereupon entertained suspicions toward the officials and 
                                               
6 To construct his arguments of the moral meteorology of the ruling elites, Elvin examined the chapters on 
Reverence for Heaven (Jing Tian) in the Sacred Instructions of the Qing emperors from the reign of Kangxi to 
Daoguang. The entire collection is called the Shichao shengxun (The Sacred Instructions of Ten Reigns [1616- 
1874], 十朝圣训). See p. 215 and footnote 6 in Elvin's (1998b) Osiris article. 
Wee-Kiat LIM 
Page 11 of 20 
A version of this manuscript was shared at D. Kim Foundation Workshop, January 5, 2015 
commoners of these localities, fearing there might be causes for them to have called 
this down upon themselves (Elvin 1998b:226). 
If there are repeated disasters and famines in a particular area, then, since the heart-
mind of Heaven is compassionate and loving, this will most certainly not be a case 
of punishment being sent down without cause (Elvin 1998b:228).  
 
Despite the examples of moral meteorology espoused by the governing elites, there was no 
one monolithic and overwhelming rationality. As pointed out by Elvin (1998b), other theories of 
meteorology existed, such as the imbalance of yin and yang or acts of specific deities (e.g., God 
of Sea was responsible for coastal floods, not Heaven), and not uncommonly, had fused with the 
Confucian-based moral rationality. In addition, the physical environment could have created the 
conditions in which the concept of moral meteorology could take root. As Elvin (1998b) argues, 
moral meteorology was particularly convincing for the governing elites because of the highly 
variable weather in North China during late imperial period:  
Perhaps only high short-term variability can provide enough short-term 
coincidences—such as apparent responses to prayers—to sustain belief in the moral 
meteorological mechanisms (p. 215).    
 
I argue that the influence of moral meteorology went beyond a theory of causation that 
explained why disasters happen in late imperial China. When welded with Confucian sensitivities 
of morality, moral meteorology served as an impetus for Qing governing elites to mitigate, prepare, 
and respond to disasters, manifested at the levels of both individual conduct of the governing elites 
and state action. Janku (2007; 2009) detailed at the individual level of how local history of disasters 
memorialized the moral exemplars of officials in the wake of natural disasters. For example, the 
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achievements of the Fenxi county magistrate, Yu Zhongde, in the late nineteenth century was 
described in the county gazetteer and a stele of the temple built in his honor (Janku 2009). 
I have discussed the role that moral meteorology as a folk theory on causation of disasters 
also animated Qing governing elites to manage disasters. Next, I will discuss the practical and 
administrative aspects of disaster management, specifically the role of the granary system as an 
expression of state administration, especially during disaster response and recovery stages. 
Enter the Ever-normal Granaries 
To be clear, several methods used in Qing disaster management and in the case famine 
control were already known to the governing elites as early as the Song period (960-1279) several 
centuries ago. As Will (1990) points out, they included “surveys of the disaster and its victims, the 
regular distribution of grain, public soup kitchens” (p. 74). What was innovative and remarkable 
was that the Qing state exerted way greater influence at the local level in executing a relative 
successful state-managed famine administration at the expense of the local gentry.7 Here, I focus 
on one prominent formal disaster response during late imperial China: Using the granary system 
to disburse disaster relief. To review the Qing granary system, particularly its disaster relief role, 
I consulted works by Will (1990), Will and Wong (1991), and Shiue (2004; 2005). I also referenced 
heavily book reviews by Rowe (1992), Macauley (1995), and Vogel (1995) on Will and Wong’s 
(1991) now-classic Nourish the People. 
                                               
7 Will (1990) points out that this could be partially attributed to the Qing monarchy being keenly aware of how the 
local gentry undermined state authority near the end of Ming dynasty (1368-1644) that preceded its reign, and 
therefore had been systematically stripping the propertied class of its feudal privileges, and assiduously increased 
state involvement at local levels. 
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There were three main types of civilian granaries in the Qing system: (1) ever-normal 
granaries (changping cang, 常平仓), (2) charity granaries (yi cang, 义仓), and (3) community 
granaries (she cang, 社仓).8 Of the three, only ever-normal granaries were under the purview of 
the government, managed by the local magistrates and their staff, and serving those residing near 
the county seats. Besides providing relief grain, the ever-normal granary system was also designed 
to be a buffer stock during non-disaster periods by regulating market prices through annual 
purchases and sales and distributing pre-harvest (or soudure) loans in spring, before the first crops 
of the year came in (Shiue 2004; Will and Wong 1991). In contrast, the charity and community 
granaries were usually located in towns or villages, supervised by the local people. These granaries 
were also relatively smaller, compared to the state-owned and bureaucratically managed ever-
normal granaries. Most grain remained within the area where it was stored. In fact, less than one 
per cent of annual grain stocks were transferred to another province, or even elsewhere within the 
same province (Shiue 2004). 
While the granary system was not an invention of the Qing state, it was revived by Kangxi 
and then significantly expanded during Qianlong’s reign. At its zenith of administrative 
complexity between 1740s and 1770s, at least 12 provinces amassed at least one million bushels 
each, reaching a peak of 45 million shi (or dan) in the 1790s (Will and Wong 1991).9 Vogel (1995) 
notes that during the period of the granary system’s greatest success, most regional variations were 
in fact deliberate, attesting to its adaptability and capacity. As Macauley (1995) and Rowe (1992) 
further remark, Will and Wong’s (1991) impressive administrative history of Qing granary system 
successfully challenged and debunked the received wisdom of previous historiographical accounts 
                                               
8 There were also granaries for military garrisons. For the purpose of this paper, I excluded them from discussion. 
9 See Will and Wong (1991), pp. 21-22 and Appendix Table A.1. Shi or dan is calculated in unhusked grain. 
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that assessed late imperial China to be crippled by ineffectual bureaucracy. The ever-normal 
granaries were designed to work through the market because the Qing government did not intend 
to upset the prevalent grain prices.  
As succinctly described by Shiue (2004), the granaries require consistent and continual 
maintenance and investment in order to remain effective in stabilizing regional grain market prices, 
and performing disaster relief disbursal: 
Consistent investments in the maintenance and upkeep of the granaries would have 
been critical to their long-run operation. To prevent spoilage over years of normal 
harvest, county officials had to sell or loan (with interest) old grain from the 
previous harvest and use this money to acquire fresh grain for restocking through 
market purchases, or, by soliciting contributions from local residents. In years when 
relief was needed, county officials were supposed to sell the ever-normal granary 
stocks at reduced prices or distribute grain to the poor. If ever-normal grain was 
distributed outright for famine relief, then the local administration would be 
reimbursed by the central government (p. 105). 
 
Grain relief disbursal itself also entailed a plethora of administrative procedures, including 
various audits, as well as checks and balances to reduce administrative malfeasance at the local 
level. As Will (1990) meticulously recounts, officials were expected to follow prescribed 
regulations that covered both routine and non-routine operations. For example, under a certain 
threshold of geographical size, problems were initially handled by local officials; when situations 
were deemed to be urgent, the palace memorial (zouzhe, 奏折), albeit exclusive to provincial 
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officials and above, would be deployed.10 Alternatively, a special emissary who had the authority 
to prevail upon the magistrates or bypass the hierarchical channels would be sent from the court 
to supervise local famine administration. Kangxi also built on an existing Ming regulation to 
routinize reporting on grain prices, weather, and harvest conditions, further complementing the 
development of the granary system (Will and Wong 1991).  
Conjoining Moral Meteorology and the Granary System 
Different cultures craft particular answers to address perennial questions around 
“prevention, emergency aid, and reconstruction” (Mauch 2009:13). In this working paper, I 
highlight how the longstanding moral meteorology provided the ideological scripts and schemas 
for the Qing state to legitimize its involvement in disaster relief, building on and refining legacy 
granary administrative system toward disaster relief. In fact, the principle of disasters could not be 
attributed to natural forces, but were instead connected to the moral conduct of the governing elites, 
went beyond symbolism to shape expectations of imperial and bureaucratic responsibility 
(Edgerton-Tarpley 2012; Li 2007).  
Notwithstanding the ideological scripts and schemas associated with the granary system, it 
was undoubtedly a highly resource- and attention-intensive enterprise to build, revise, and 
maintain such a gargantuan system that served multiple purposes, among which disaster relief was 
a critical function (Will and Wong 1991). In tandem the fiscal crisis brewing and coalescing from 
the early nineteenth century, the administrative rigor empire-wide was also fading. The increase 
in resources for the state bureaucracy failed to keep up with the expanding population, the 
                                               
10 The zouzhe system dramatically reduced the time taken for communication between the capital and provinces. 
According to Will (1990), the greatest speed recorded was “on the order of 800 li (400 km) in 24 hours,” while the 
norm was about 300 li (p. 80). 
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increasing complexity of society, and pressing environment stresses from the mid-eighteenth 
century (Hung 2009). As Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate, grain price was not stable but followed a 
rising trend and the ration of disaster/famine relief offered was decreasing from mid-eighteenth 
century. 
Figure 1. Grain Price, 1650-1900 (Hung 2011:25) 
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Figure 2. Ration of Famine/Disaster Relief, 1700-1839 (Hung 2011:32) 
 
Interestingly, I observe that the strength of the moral meteorological rationality espoused 
by the governing elites seems to correspond to the strength of the granary administration and its 
function of famine relief. Specifically, the variant that linked local moral conduct to local 
calamities started to wane from the reign of Jiaqing (1796-1820). In its place, more administrative 
and pseudo-scientific reasons became more acceptable explanations of why disasters befell upon 
some locations. For example, during the reign of Tongzhi (1861 to 1875), instead of moral 
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misconduct, the emperor attributed the prolonged rains in 1871 to the “low-lying and swampy 
topography” at Shuntian, Baoding, Tianjin, and Hejian (Elvin 1998b:231). It is as if the governing 
elites were attempting to decouple government action from manifestations of disasters.  
That said, while moral meteorology was losing its grip on the governing elites, this 
ideology had not completely faded away. Using the same 1871 rain example, the remedy 
recommended by the emperor was to correct any judicial mistake or misconduct that had 
imprisoned innocent persons. This still implied a moral solution to a meteorological problem. 
Conclusion  
By showing the interactions between moral meteorology and disaster management 
practices during late imperial China, I demonstrate how the ideational-ideological intersects with 
the materialistic-administrative. This integrative approach then offers a more complete and 
nuanced understanding of what could be constituted as disaster management by the state during 
that era.  
I argue that this approach of combining ideological and administrative historiographies 
could become a general and meaningful framework to examine the historiography of disaster 
management beyond the high Qing period or imperial China. For example, specific to the United 
States, this integrative approach could be an interesting lens to examine the socio-historical context 
in which the concept of “victim” to characterize disaster survivors emerged and the extent to which 
it shaped the 1950 Disaster Relief Act and successive policies and practices in disaster relief 
(Tierney 2007). 
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